Theorists in the 1990s expected that high involvement practices would be widely used by manufacturers as they sought to improve organizational performance. Yet the adoption of such practices has been partial and limited. I find that varying combinations of work arrangements may satisfy management goals and while many configurations appear to be 'lean enough,' one commonality among the cases observed here is that worker empowerment is limited in both depth and breadth. Organizations perform limited searches of alterative routines and stop once they are satisfied. Employee involvement is limited because, among other reasons, the conditions for what I call substantive empowerment require a change in routine and authority structure apparently not necessary to achieve the largely technical goals of management. The result is a neo-Taylorist framework in which appropriation and standardization of workers' knowledge is still undertaken, but through a form of bureaucratic control I call nominal empowerment, which effectively solicits workers ideas through a consultative form of participation. While an organization can become lean enough with nominal empowerment, due to institutionalized union power, union shopsdue to institutionalized worker power -already have some of the negative effects (from an employer standpoint) of substantive empowerment and may face a host of more serious obstacles to nominal empowerment, thus generating conditions under which the push toward substantive empowerment is not significantly riskier for managers.
method of signaling to upstream operations what parts are needed, usually via a small container. A key notion of lean production is kaizen or continuous improvement.
The promise of lean production
Like other post-Fordist theorists (Kenny and Florida 1988; Piore and Sabel 1984; Womack, Jones and Roos 1990) , MacDuffie argues that new work systems invert traditional Taylorism. Lean or "flexible" production is above all about the reduction of buffers (e.g., inventory, indirect workers) to immediately expose defects and other quality and process problems that were formerly hidden in large stocks of inventory or otherwise unknown due to a fragmented production process. To work properly the bufferless lean production system requires extensive employee involvement; "workers must have both a conceptual grasp of the production process and the analytical skills to identify the root cause of problems" so that they may "identify and resolve problems as they appear on the line " (1995a: 201; see also 1995b) . Teams of empowered workers replace an authoritarian, rule-based form of management. For MacDuffie, lean or "flexible production systems have a distinct 'organizational logic' that integrates bundles of human resource practices [geared toward the expansion of workforce skills] with manufacturing practices [geared toward minimization of buffers] in pursuit of simultaneous improvements in productivity and quality" and "exerts a powerful pull toward internal consistency within these bundles " (1995a: 198, 200; 1995b; MacDuffie and Kochan 1995; Pil and MacDuffie 1996) . MacDuffie's bundle theory predicts widespread adoption of and convergence around a high-involvement model of lean production.
MacDuffie and collaborators have made significant contributions to the debate but their theoretical approach has serious shortcomings. Perhaps most importantly is the neglect of social and political relationships within firms. MacDuffie's one attempt to explicitly deal with social relations in the firm shows the limits of an apolitical understanding of the firm. He notes, quite dubiously, that there was no regard for any social order in Fordist firms, but that "under lean production, the social entity is too important to be ignored by management. ... lean production ... legitimizes the informal social network in a company as an important source of coordination and commitment" (1995a: 58) . This ignores or seriously downplays a host of antagonisms, conflicts and behavioral strategies that give extant structures a certain tenacity. Marx (1990 Marx ( [1867 ) focused on contradiction in the labor process, including the potential difficulties employers face in translating the labor power of workers into labor, highlighting the problems of labor effort and control. Bowles and Gintis (1990) argue that the problem of "contested exchange" is solved through threats of various sorts, principally that of being fired, coupled with direct monitoring. For Braverman (1974) it was the Taylorist process of deskilling, again with direct monitoring that solved the problem of control. Rather than focus on coercion, Burawoy drew on the Gramscian notion of hegemony, shifting discussion to mechanisms of consent: the concrete coordination of interests among employers and workers, and the active participation of workers in the production of surplus value (1979; 1985; Wright and Burawoy 1994) .
Organizational political economy: Toward a micropolitics of work restructuring
Burawoy shows how workers become actively engaged in the labor process, constructing games of various sorts to counteract boredom and deprivation, thus producing consent to rules and the desirability of certain outcomes. Workers "develop a stake in those rules and objectives, as can be seen when management intervenes to change them or somehow infringes on them " (1985: 38) . This suggests that an important element of restructuring is how workers defend and negotiate changes to particular arrangements they have developed stakes in. Rather than assuming that participatory arrangements are more intrinsically rewarding in some objective sense (cf. Hackman and Oldham 1980) it may be expected that workers will defend traditional arrangements and/or be skeptical of new practices proposed by management.
While the need to control is constant, the form of control changes in response to developments internal and external to the labor process. Externally, globalization has made possible capital flight, global outsourcing, plant disinvestment and closure. As fear of these possibilities replaces the fear of being fired, the regime of control inside the plant changes: "where labour used to be granted concessions on the basis of the expansion of profits, it now makes concessions on the basis of the relative profitability of on capitalist vis-à-vis another" (Burawoy 1985: 150) . International competition and the globalization of production have eroded certain elements of the Fordist compromise. Other elements of the Fordist labor process are being transformed form within. While Burawoy has much to say on worker strategy, I turn to mainstream organization theory to help understand management strategy and the changing technical division of labor.
In the introduction to the second edition of their classical treatise March and Simon argue that "Ambiguity of goals and goal conflict, as well as human ignorance and error are significant parts of the picture of behavior in organizations. The actions of individuals in an organization may aim at the official organizational goals, or some quite different and wholly personal goals " (1993: 8) . Within organizations individuals take action either based on a set of rules or according to a "satisficing" rationality involving a selective search for alternatives which are "evaluated for their satisfactoriness as they are found " (1993: 8; my emphasis) . Given the overwhelming complexity of alternatives and anticipated outcomes, such choice always involves a simplified, approximate model or definition of the situation, which "differs greatly from the objective situation" (1993: 173; 160-61) .
Using a limited definition of the situation organizational actors tend to "evaluate action only in terms of subgoals, even when these are in conflict with the goals of the larger organization " (1993: 173) . This framework helps shed light on the limits of the Fordist-Taylorist labor process that generate pressures to restructure the technical division of labor. Fordism encouraged a series of discrete sub-goal foci at the expense of the larger organizational goals with its functional focus and departmental organization. This context of task fragmentation, organizationally disconnected operations, and focus on machine-level efficiency and capacity shaped the gaming and other active strategies of direct workers and first-line supervisors, extending to middle managers focusing on functional sub-goals, such as output maximization at the expense of quality (Dohse, Jugens and Malsch 1985; Forrant 2000) .
Lean production can thus been seen is an attempt to subordinate sub-goals to larger goals through various institutional arrangements to transform functional into product-focused organization, building quality control into the process and engendering an overall system focus in workers. Yet inherent tensions remain, particularly with regard the contradictory tendencies of standardization and work codification versus increased employee participation (Appelbaum and Batt 1994; Lawler 1994 ). Adler and Borys note an analogous tension in views on bureaucracy: "A negative view suggests that the bureaucratic form attempts to coerce effort and compliance, thus stifling creativity, while the positive view proposes that bureaucracy enables mastery of tasks by codifying best practice, providing guidance, clarifying responsibilities and easing role stress" (1996: 61-2). Key aspects of bureaucracy -formalization, specialization and hierarchy -may improve individual performance by reducing role conflict and ambiguity. Adler uses the NUMMI example to reconcile these two views, arguing that their lean arrangements constitute an "enabling bureaucracy": "NUMMI's standardized work process focused on work methods and assumed that better time standards would emerge from the discovery of better methods; traditional Taylorism focused on time standards, and assumed that failure to meet them was due not to inadequate methods but to insufficient effort by the worker" (Adler 1995: 215-6 ).
Adler's focus on the form of bureaucracy is analytically useful but incomplete; his own analysis centers on the formalization aspect only, neglecting not only specialization and hierarchy but more generally the form of participation. One alternative institutional configuration has been demonstrated by Vallas (2003: 243-5) who's analysis showed that conflicting logics of standardization versus participation may impede the transcendence of traditional authority relations, as the technical rationality of standardization and quantification overshadows the normative issues involved in developing participatory teams. While Vallas' careful analysis has much to offer, employer efforts at EI may not be simply rhetorical/ideological (1999: 90). "Deeper" forms of participation may reduce hierarchy and broaden tasks and goals, thus eroding key elements of enabling bureaucracy. In this case the type of goal conflict generated by Fordism -subgoals misaligned with larger goals -may be replaced with role conflict generated by ambiguity of goals and means.
Participation, empowerment and neo-Taylorism
Early debates on empowerment did not have much nuance -either empowerment or exploitation -and seem to fizzle out, if in an unresolved state, to some degree. However, outside the lean production debates the same issues have been conceptualized in more fruitful ways. Levine and Tyson distinguish three forms of participation. Consultative participation "allows employees to give their opinions, but final decisions are still made by management. … While worker suggestions are solicited, workers are not permitted to decide how to solve problems " (1990: 189) . Substantive participation "includes formal, direct participation schemes … members of work teams are given wide discretion in organizing their own work and operate with little supervision " (1990: 189-90) . Finally, representative participation "includes workers' councils, joint labor-management committees, and employee representation on company boards of directors " (1990: 190) . Batt and Appelbaum (1995) adopt this typology 4 in their empirical analysis, emphasizing that the distinction between consultative and substantive forms is sometimes referred to as off-line versus on-line participation. The distinction between consultative and substantive forms is analytically useful, but it does not map on to the offline/online distinction very well. In practice many online teams have little autonomy and/or involvement in decision-making and, by the same token, there is no logical reason why offline teams cannot engage workers in directly in problem-solving or substantive decision-making.
While consultative participation differs in important ways from the traditional Taylorist model, it should not therefore be automatically equated empowerment. Power involves not just new responsibilities but the effective authority to claim resources, make decisions and alter routines (Babson 1995: 5) . If we take the reference to a change in asymmetrical power relations seriously the consultative form of participation is most accurately characterized as a nominal -slight -change. Substantive empowerment, then, involves new responsibilities -including regular involvement in problem-solving and decision-making activities -along with the formal authority and effective capacity. Hallmarks of substantive empowerment include workers organized in self-directed teams, lateral communication with team members and experts outside the team, direct engagement in deliberation and decision-making, and authority to alter organizational routines. Nominal empowerment involves the active seeking of input from and/or the delegation of new responsibilities to workers, but without effective authority or regular, direct engagement in decision-making and problem-solving. Hallmarks of nominal empowerment include new responsibilities without authority to alter organizational routines, ability to give input but not make decisions, occasional engagement in problemsolving, and a traditional authority structure.
If the autonomy associated with substantive empowerment may heighten the conflict between standardization and participation, the more limited consultation of nominal empowerment is a good fit. Adler's description of NUMMI suggests a neoTaylorist model; while some elements of substantive empowerment are present "The emphasis on standardized work methods meant that workers had no autonomy whatsoever in how they performed their tasks" (1995: 210, 213-14) . Neo-Taylorism may be defined in contrast to the three core dimensions of traditional Taylorism (Braverman 1974: Ch. 5; Friedman 1977: 91-96) . The first principle, gather and systematize workers' traditional knowledge, becomes simply gather and systematize workers' tacit knowledge. Second, specify each task in complete detail, including "how it is to be done and the exact time allowed for doing it" (Taylor, 1899 , quoted in Friedman 1977 remains the same, though deskilling may be replaced with task integration and multiskilling. The final principle, "All possible brain work should be removed from the shop and centred in the planning or layout department" (Taylor, 1904 , quoted in Friedman 1977 , is replaced with an emphasis on enlisting workers idea generation. Workers are no longer treated as machines, or simple physical labor power to be extracted and tightly controlled, but as potential sources of ideas and innovation. Theoretically neo-Taylorism is perfectly compatible with nominal empowerment and, as the NUMMI case shows, appears to be compatible also with some degree of substantive empowerment, though incongruence increases the more the empowerment leads to increased autonomy and decreased hierarchy.
The argument developed above suggests that nominal empowerment is a more likely outcome in the context of lean production. The major benefits of lean production come not from EI as such but from reduced buffers and lead times, and improved workflow and production processes. If you can get continuous improvement without substantive participation, as others have shown (Dohse, Jugens and Malsch 1985; Helper 1995; Lewchuk and Robertson 1997; Vallas and Beck 1996) then most of the benefits of lean production can be captured. It is expected that certain technical changes -various lean tools within a neo-Taylorist framework -will satisfy management criteria (improved quality, reduced lead times and inventory, increased flexibility) without having to substantially alter authority structures. This argument is consonant with the large literature on participation, which has failed to yield consistent, practically significant effects of participation as such on performance (Wagner 1994) . But there is one final point to complete the argument.
The role of unions
It has been argued that under certain conditions unions may facilitate the substantive empowerment of workers under lean production. Following Lawler (1992) , Adler and Borys (1996) argue that the enabling bureaucracy may be impeded by asymmetries in power, skills, knowledge and rewards. They suggest that "Institutionalized employee voice … would appear to be not only corollary of but also a necessary condition for the reduction of all four kinds of asymmetry " (1996: 81) . Clearly unions may remain a potent source of resistance. However, as Vallas' (2003) research suggests, active union involvement may help drive workplace change in a participatory direction. Union governance may provide a framework for substantive devolution of authority to make decisions and share power. When there are clear rules about when employers can and can't discipline and fire exercising power is less risky.
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Another line of argument suggests a more indirect mechanism through which unions may facilitate substantive empowerment. Unions are an independent form of power providing an institutional mechanism through which workers may appropriate and solidify effective authority (Eaton 1995) , resulting in a situation where managers do not already have complete control of the workplace, thus changing the incentive structure and risk profile of nominal versus substantive empowerment (Figure 1) .
In a nonunion shop, the changes required for nominal empowerment are relatively straightforward, consisting in a series of technical changes using lean tools coupled with the solicitation of workers' ideas and occasional, usually voluntary and limited involvement in offline teams. These largely technical changes are relatively low risk with a high probable payoff. However, the significant changes in authority structure and need for active involvement of a substantial portion of the workforce necessary for substantive empowerment poses significantly more risk, and it is uncertain what the marginal payoff is above that already achieved under a regime of nominal empowerment. Substantial change requires vision and risk taking (Hackman and Oldham 1980: 250) . In a union shop, however, managers often have to deal with contractual issues such as seniority rights and extremely detailed job classifications. Many changes must be negotiated and the employer confronts a potentially organized resistance. Under these conditions even nominal empowerment may be interpreted as higher risk. However, the presence of a union alters the authority structure of the plant in significant ways; from the employer's perspective many of the negative effects of substantive empowerment are already present. The risks of moving to substantive empowerment may not be much higher than the risks of nominal empowerment in a union shop. Even if the payoff is uncertain, the costs of further altering the authority structure are significantly less. 
Data and method
The present analysis is based on a six plants that made significant attempts to implement lean production, for which I conducted a total of forty semi-structured interviews: twenty-seven workers, ten managers, and the Business Representative for each of the three union shops. Ideally of course there would be many more worker interviews per firm. However getting access to employers, especially during a recession as when all my research was carried out is a very hard and time-consuming task. The likelihood of getting into a given firm decreases as the amount of time you ask for increases. Trying to balance out these issues I settled on asking employers if I could interview 4-6 workers. The management interviews ranged from one and a half to over three hours total and the worker interviews ranged from half an hour to one hour. In each firm management was asked to select a group of workers "roughly representative" (though of course not in the statistical sense) of their workforce based on the following criteria: skill level/position, tenure, gender, race. Each site visit included a plant tour. Additionally, I attended seven two-hour labor-management committee meetings, one worker education committee meeting, and one shop-floor training exercise at one union shop; and seven two-hour labor-management committee meetings, two worker education committee meetings, one local union meeting, and one half-day presentation by the IAM High Performance Work Organization department at another union shop. Finally, as many documents as possible were collected, including performance metrics, memoranda and reports. The transcripts have been entered into QSR N6 qualitative software. Blocks of text are coded into categories that are then used to cross-reference across firms, with a total of 27 categories for management and 20 for workers (e.g., subcategories within "labor process" for workers are "work routine, skill, learning, EI, effort, and problems"). All names are pseudonyms.
'Lean enough' with nominal empowerment Tubefab: work organization
A non-union shop, Tubefab makes tubular products and filters. The Tubefab case demonstrates how some of the sheer technical obstacles to implementing lean production affect a manager's definition of the situation in a way that de-emphasizes EI and empowerment. In much of the plant Tubefab is quite lean in terms of JIT. They have moved from having separate functional departments for tube bending, tube finishing and tube assembly to having all of operations combined in a single fabrication department composed of product-focused cells. Inventory buffers have been reduced and batch production has been replaced with continuous flow.
Yet, they maintain a separate press department. There is some continuous flow, but it remains a separate department in large part because of some huge 400-ton straightside presses that are "a logistical nightmare" to move. Furthermore, as the plant manager noted their highest volume cell runs continuously at about 140 parts an hour … there's five pressed components in there. So that's only ... 700 parts an hour that you need to make. And generally straight-sides can run 1,200 to 2,000 parts an hour depending on the size of the part. So you're only utilizing that press to half capacity.
[U]nless you had … one press feeding two cells somehow, it would be a challenge. … Or if you redesigned dies to make less hits an hour but get multiple different parts out of the die or something, but, you know. It would be a struggle.
This is not to say that the problem is insurmountable, and indeed many lean gurus would love to tackle the job. But the key question here is not so much is it possible as will it happen? What are the pressures they face? The mantra of "business in today's world," a common refrain in my interviews and in the business press, is that three things are given: price, quality and delivery. Tubefab is doing well in terms of profits and customers, and thus apparently competing on price. Since, as they understand it, they have implemented lean production, their PPMs -defect parts per million, a key quality measure for large volume producers -have gone from around 1500 to around 100 and on-time delivery has gone from below 90% to about 98%.
Tubefab's understanding of what they need to do to stay ahead does not include substantively empowering their workforce. The labor process in commodity markets is competitive but relatively simple: stamping, welding and simple assembly of basic pieces of basic materials. You have to be good at it but there's not much you can do beyond a certain point in terms of work organization. So they compete in design:
The form tube market is tough because you compete against a lot of shops that all they do is form tubes … a mom-and-pop shop on the corner that has three benders and … virtually no overhead. … [W]e have an engineering technical center that we need to support. … but if somebody was just looking for a form tube supplier, did their own design work, did everything themselves, that's tough for us to compete. But with a total system approach, we do alright.
When concerned with work reorganization, technical problems and a focus on key lean metrics (e.g., inventory) dominate the focus of attention:
We looked at pull systems … unless your reaction time is so low, you end up with more things sitting in the system than you would if you just added a week into lead time. … You end up with parts at every station in the system and it doesn't work out. … We do some kanban and it works out really well, but in some cases we've found that the kanban almost adds more inventory to your system because … of the way we're set up departmentally. You know, if everything was in a perfect line, you could probably get away with it. But if you're making 400, 500 different part numbers and trying to run them all at the same time, it's a struggle
The sheer complexity of the production process -not least of which is the wide variation in exactly how customers are set up for orders and how effective customers are in their own JIT and forecasting systems -compels not only a limited definition of the situation, but certain compromises from the ideal design (Hackman and Oldham 1980: 121, 248) .
You talk about reducing setup times in press, reducing setup times in fabrication … everything we do, we try to take time out of the system. We're still certainly not to the point where we can … not have a forecast and [react to the needs of a typical customer]. We'll have a truck loaded and they contact us and say, 'Take those off. We need these.' And we need to build them … if we didn't have some inventory of component parts built so we can put them together, we could never do that.
Tubefab: employee involvement
In terms of performance Tubefab is apparently lean and flexible, effectively doing JIT for their customers. And while they have opportunities for involvement through offline quality and safety teams and kaizen teams that people can volunteer for, overall they still maintain a quite traditional management structure. To the extent that conception and execution have been reintegrated, it is within a neo-Taylorist framework. Some workers are involved in setup reduction but this process is initiated and supervised by a continuous improvement (CI) coordinator through occasional kaizen events; the offline teams are composed of volunteers and Tubefab operates without online work teams. An (hourly) assistant supervisor described the continuous improvement process:
Initially I feel it was more or less just kind of thrown on the table for us. But then after it was thrown out, then, you know now is when the employee involvement is coming in. 'Well, okay, this is what we have to do. How do we get there most efficiently? Okay, you're the one that's working on it day after day after day, so you come up with a better way. This is the direction we're heading," you know management kind of points you in a direction, but you have to get to the destination. ... we probably go through and make changes, run after run. ... It's a continuing learning process.
This description is very characteristic of the lean process, constant tinkering and continual learning. And while employee input is actively solicited and workers ideas are often tried, this process operates within the framework of a traditional authority hierarchy -topics and goals are defined by management, employee autonomy is severely restricted, and deliberation and decision-making are limited. Again, this is a significant change from the traditional Taylorist model as workers are nominally empowered to offer ideas to improve processes, perhaps improving parts of their routine. Still the mechanisms of EI here function to extract workers' ideas for continuous improvement without devolving authority.
A front-line worker describes the core EI process in more detail:
A new job comes into the plant where a lot of times we'll have a meeting … to get everybody's ideas. We'll bring welders in and people from press department in, see if they have any ideas on any issues with the new product. A lot of times that will help if we can get, if … somebody will bring something up ahead of time that we might not know, we can solve that problem before it becomes a problem. I think we need more of that. ... But … the foreman and the production people [i.e., CI coordinator and manufacturing engineers] don't want to pull these guys off the line, because that's our moneymaker ... they don't want to pull them off the line for a half hour to come into a meeting, or for an hour and sit in a meeting, they kind of shy away from that.
The process is directed and controlled by managers and engineers. Furthermore, the extent of EI is limited not only in depth but in breadth. Generally, offline teams are staffed by a limited group of volunteers. And the tendency not to "pull them off the line," reflecting conflicting imperatives, further limits the breadth of EI. The tendency to treat workers as sources of ideas and innovation conflicts with the tendency to treat direct labor as a commodity. Every second of front-line workers' time, if not directly doing physical work -"adding value" -is considered a waste. This latter tendency is indicated further by a lack of communication and information sharing: "I think there's just so many things that a person don't know what's going on around here. You know? And they do show us, when we're having like a good month or something … but … there's … no kickback on that either … what do we get out of it? [We] work our butts off for it." When further probed about the main ways in which they can contribute their ideas to improve production processes the assistant supervisor replied "Anytime anybody has an issue or a way to make things better, they generally take it up with the foreman. ... It's general one-on-one communication with the supervisor." Others agreed that one-on-one communication with the foreman was the main channel for employee input, not unlike a suggestion program. It would surely be a stretch to say that a workplace in which management regularly implemented employee suggestions from a traditional suggestion program had a substantively empowered workforce; there are no signs of increased autonomy, authority or power sharing.
The periodic kaizen events function simply to elicit ideas rather than as fora for the reintegration of conception and execution: "We have a few meetings. You know they've got meetings where you can put your input in. I mean if something gets done or not is another story, but they do let you put your input in." This last comment was a common refrain indicating how little workers were actually involved in making decisions. Another worker indicates that his work cell now has "Welding, tubing, flanging. They cut it, [de-]burr it, and put the flange on it while they're right there and [ship it] out from there." But the decisions about job rotation, task delegation, etc. are "up to the foreman … if the foreman don't want you to do it, then you can't."
Integrated Corp: work organization Also a nonunion shop, Integrated a much larger company that has some work organized into functional departments and other work organized into product-focused departments that largely cellularized. They are, on the whole less lean than Tubefab. Yet they have been able to institutionalize a neo-Taylorist process of kaizen in which they are constantly tinkering with the production process but without much substantive involvement of front-line workers. While workers are offered the opportunity -indeed, highly encouraged to -give their ideas about process improvement, their jobs are in general highly regimented and traditionally organized.
In contrast to the other plants examined here which are all under 250 employees, Integrated is a large plant with 1000 employees. Yet, it is appropriate to include it because it provides some useful contrasts. Integrated has an OEM product but is also a high-volume supplier of plastic components and various types of subassemblies. It is a very complex mix of implementing many lean principles -teams of various sorts, 5S and total quality management (TQM) standardization/quality control tools, and JIT and continuous flow principles on a pull system in some areas -with a relatively splintered overall organizational structure and many functional departments. In the latter they run extremely high volume batches of simple products using highly automated and extremely flexible robotic machines able to do subassemblies of small plastic and metal parts.
The neo-Taylorist division of labor includes highly detailed job classifications (of standardized and often rote tasks) organized into online work teams that are involved in continuous improvement activities. At the department level they have "Quality Assurance Teams," under which are between three and six "Manufacturing Process Improvement Teams" per department. Integrated claimed to being running small lot sizes and doing JIT with a kanban system, though it was not clear to me how thoroughly and effectively they had implemented these practices. My observations during a plant tour suggested that there may be some serious problems with haphazard product routings and work flow. Nonetheless, they claimed that on-time delivery, quality and inventory management have been steadily improving, though I wasn't able to get any specifics.
Integrated Corp: employee involvement
Integrated has implemented the "team concept," in their own way very extensively at many levels, with both online and offline teams. They have periodic group meetings and a yearly anonymous survey to get employee feedback. But decisions on reorganization and new layouts are made by supervisors and engineers and implemented as such. Despite all of the teams at various levels, front-line workers were not involved crossfunctional teams regarding restructuring. Again, in spite of much talk about kaizen and worker input, there seemed to be little substantive empowerment here. One worker noted the more-or-less traditional process of work reorganization: "The individual department supervisors can put in for reorganization of the department, but I think it still has to go through channels above their heads to get the okay to do it." Still, with their online teams of cross-trained workers Integrated had achieved a substantial amount of functional flexibility in their ability to deploy the same labor for different product lines and task mixes. They are relatively lean in terms of practices like point of use production, smaller lot sizes, and less WIP. Moreover offline teams focused on process improvements and employees generally, in the words of one worker "look at procedures … [and] always [try] to make it faster and better and easier on the person and everything else." But this continuous improvement happens in the context of traditional authority hierarchy. As the plant manager described:
We have manufacturing engineers … they are to be out here on the floor, working with the supervisors, talking to the associates on the floor, looking at a piece of equipment, how can they make that more efficient? Obviously you have to look at the costs of doing this … If nothing else, if you can make it more ergonomically friendly for the associate, you still have a best experience because the associate's happier, okay?
Workers can make suggestions to make their work better, and this is actively encouraged by management, but is a top-down process, initiated and controlled by engineers. Indeed, management does use the language of substantive empowerment: "We want the associates to take more ownership than what they do [to be] self-directed." This vision, however, includes not increased autonomy, deliberation and decision-making, but simply the active generation of ideas for mangers and engineers to consider: "Can they [participate and give input]? Yes, absolutely. But it's not designated that they have to go to a specific person. It's really going through their elite person on the floor, going through their supervisor, or stopping an engineer … [M]y people are instructed that you will listen to the associates, alright, because that's where a lot of these ideas are generated, because they work with it every day."
The plant manager is satisfied with their current institutional configuration that has been able to achieve continuous improvement with consultative participation or nominal empowerment:
We've had consultants in here in the past, which actually gives us ideas on how to do this. And then we actually now are doing some of this on our own. … We have some very creative people on the floor, and our supervisors … they've come up with a new way of scheduling, which is basically just-in-time.
[I]t doesn't push things through, it pulls them through. And that goes all the way back to purchasing where we're ordering the raw materials and it all flows through here.
A worker with 19 years tenure described her experience with group projects. I asked if her team has group meetings:
A lot. … If something comes down, we just quick gather together for five minutes and, 'This is what's happening,' you know.
Are the group meetings then also an opportunity for the workers to give their input into like changes about…
Yeah, if there's any questions, you know, we'll quick ask them. Of course you have safety meetings each month too, and at the end of each safety meeting [they'll] say, " [Are] there any questions about anything?" and then we can talk there too. But the gathering, yeah, [they] make sure everybody understands.
Asked if there has been real decentralization of decision-making authority she enthusiastically replied, "Definitely." But then when I asked for more detail she gave the following reply, indicating the nominal character of such empowerment:
Basically it would kind of seem like in years past that we would hear something through the grapevine kind of thing, and then it would happen. And now, when it's going to happen, they'll tell us what's going to happen, and what to expect, and get our input on it now, ahead of time. ... A lot more communication, a lot more -like the newsletter that comes out, memos. I bet we get at least ten memos a week ... they've always tried to make the employees -now they call them associates, just I mean like because we feel more like it too -but they really, really communicate, just totally tell us what's going on.
So they're honestly trying to get your input on these changes, I asked. "Yeah. Something like that, you know, there really isn't much for us to say except for the fact that we understand. They're explaining why the business is doing this." The rest of her interview indicates that little, if any of this feeling came from any increase in substantive empowerment. Some of it clearly comes from the fact that management is now willing to listen to worker input. But she had indicated the source of much of her feeling was simply from the fact that she had a high level of job security and, as the quote above indicates, increased communication from management. Thus, there is more communication about the overall process but not a substantive change in the authority structure or regular work routine in a way that substantially engage workers in problemsolving, deliberation and decision-making.
Again, I do not wish to argue that there are no real changes going on here or that there are not indeed welcome changes. One thing that stands out at Integrated is the extensive communication with front-line workers about management strategy and future plans, which contrasts with a lack of communication in other plants, generating skepticism and uneasiness on the shopfloor.
When asked about the effectiveness of worker input and the decentralization of decision-making and problem-solving, one other worker did also directly mention the TQM program and the "tons of committees." Yet for all the different team structures and opportunities to give input, the term "team" was only mentioned one time during all of my interviews with workers at Integrated: "We're very team oriented. I think we're team oriented." Here, the team concept is more about cultivating firm-centered, family identity, where "we" refers to the firm, not the workers (Edwards 1979: 148) . The work organization is apparently "lean enough" for management at Integrated, achieving continuous improvement and certain goals regarding quality and delivery within a neoTaylorist framework of nominal empowerment.
Pushing toward (some) substantive empowerment
The union plants discussed in this section have taken a step further than the nonunion plants discussed above in terms of taking out a layer of management and actively working toward self-directed teams. Yet, in each case substantive empowerment was still limited and partial, in part due to either outright resistance -as some workers defended traditional arrangements -or reticence from segments of the workforce. However, empowerment was also limited in the more structural sense that even when organizations push toward substantive empowerment it is uneven and limited in breadth; some workers simply did not experience the opportunity for anything more than consultative participation, indicating that their daily routines were largely unchanged other than being less protected by various types of buffers and sometimes having more variety.
As an introductory comment it must be noted that all three union shops have worked with the Wisconsin Regional Training Partnership (WRTP), a Milwaukee-based sectoral training organization, to help facilitate a formal-labor management partnership. While the WRTP did provide significant help negotiating labor-management relations and designing a framework for partnership in the two plants discussed in this section, it would be wrong to conclude that this intermediation was a cause of management's steps toward substantive empowerment. Rather, that management worked with the WRTP to facilitate a partnership is consequence and sign of management commitment to substantive empowerment.
Mini OE: work organization and employee involvement
A small union shop, Mini OE is a high volume producer of industrial wire wheels for metal finishing. They are almost fully cellularized with 16 assembly cells constituting four teams and 4 indirect "cells" which are departments that service the assembly cells. While Mini OE has not yet actually gotten to the point of having extensive employee involvement and substantive empowerment, this case is instructive for its determined attempt to become a "high performance work organization" (HPWO), understood explicitly as a high involvement model. They have also become lean in the process, but it is noteworthy that unlike the "lean conversions" discussed above, a substantive form of EI is explicitly part of the conceptual framework of the managers at Mini OE.
Mini OE has done extensive training in literacy and numeracy, including blueprint reading and measurement, and they understand this training, explicitly as a first step toward empowering the workforce on the road to HPWO. In their baseline testing there were only 11 people total who could pass 7th grade math efficiency, and many Asians who couldn't read English. The WRTP has facilitated the development of a labormanagement partnership at Mini OE, including helping them formulate a core labormanagement "leadership" team along with subcommittees including a revived a training committee. The WRTP has helped them formulate modules for incumbent worker training and consistent criteria for pre-employment screening. Direct employee classifications have been reduced from four to a single job classification and all employees moved up to a single pay rate. They do extensive job rotation with formal cross training which is on a voluntary basis and is tied to a pay-for-knowledge scheme.
Lead times have been reduced dramatically with the implementation of cells from 3 days down to hours. They don't have much by way of other performance metrics, however, because they were not documented until the new management came in the year before I began my interviews there. However, with the cells, training, better scheduling, material handling, and product flows they have increased output 18% with 17% less workers (though attrition) over the year.
Mini OE is working toward a gainsharing program based on four workgroups, with indirect services tied to the four cells in the group. Some concrete steps toward substantive empowerment are evident. They operate with a very flat organizational structure, only a few engineers and two managers. Scheduling and materials are handled by a union member responsible for a group of cells. At the same time they operate within a neo-Taylorist framework, as workers participate in work standardization. Direct workers are also involved in quality control, total productive maintenance (TPM) and some planning of tasks. There have not been any regular kaizen events yet but there are plans to start as they finish up the incumbent worker training and an initial process of work standardization.
Work flow has been substantially improved but they have not been able to implement a pull system yet. An employee suggestion program has been a big success, with $4700 in checks after the first round. Beyond this, however, they haven't had much success in getting employee input on improving processes in the cells. Due in large part to a low average tenure in the shop, however, they experienced little resistance to work restructuring from the rank and file. These workers have not developed significant stakes in given arrangements, and the workers I talked with indicated that there was not much discussion of the restructuring on the shopfloor. As on worker noted of the workforce "they just do their job and don't say nothing." This contrasts greatly with the other two union cases, where substantial parts of the long-tenured workforces put serious resistance and there was heated debate on the shopfloor about the reorganization. Mini OE also differs from the other two union shops in having had less detailed job classifications to begin with.
Also key terms of easing the restructuring process is that all workers moved up in pay when they went to a single classification, and they also instituted a pay-for-skill plan in which workers are paid more for learning cross-training to new machines. These characteristics -good base pay and opportunities for training with incentive paycombined with the lack of developed stakes in traditional arrangements to produce a relatively painless transformation. Another factor that has helped ease the transition at Mini OE, of course, is the collaborationist stance of the union leadership. Yet this was also a problem for a small segment of the workforce who was apparently dissatisfied with the restructuring but also felt distanced from the union.
A Mini OE manager's response to my question about his vision for worker empowerment differs quite dramatically from the operation of the otherwise lean nonunion firms I visited:
If I had a magic wand, I'd like to envision these [cells] as 16 separate little businesses standing outside that can run autonomous; have their own leaderships, skill sets, setup, repair, tooling, common material . ... Because they need to make all those decisions, scheduling, when does it go in, repair parts, maintenance, greasing and oiling, inventory transactions, training issues, product improvement, process improvements.
The union president at Mini OE describes how the labor-management committee has evolved:
In the beginning we had some struggles and misunderstandings about certain issues . ... But I would say recently ... the labor leadership team has brought many different ideas to the company and the company has listened. And vice versa, management has brought it to us and we have listened. ... [We] really came to an understanding where we respect each others' opinions and instead of criticizing ... we find ourselves sitting and listen and trying to, you know, come up with newer, innovative ideas.
I spent over six months at Mini OE attending labor-management and other committee meetings, observing the labor-management team dealing with substantive issues on a regular basis, specifying non-trivial issues over which the union side has joint decisionmaking authority, and overall making serious efforts to ensure that the teams will be able to be autonomous and truly self-directed. Management and the union committee members were clearly working toward a form of employee involvement and a decentralization of decision-making authority that simply was not contemplated in Tubefab or Integrated.
Perhaps the three major problems with Mini OE's restructuring process were apathy among the rank-and-file workers, lack of communication and lack of trust. It was a common complaint among workers that I talked to in all the plants that managers had "kept us in the dark" about changes, and similar complaints. In the case of Mini OE, as with Second Tier Corp below, this problem was as much the fault of the union as it was management. A perhaps more formidable problem as to do with trust. At Mini OE workers expressed that past management teams, and perhaps the present one too had been less than honest about particular issues. Another common complaint was "This company always starts something and never finishes it. That's our problem here." Yet a deeper issue, related also to communication, has to do with how labor-management relations are managed in the process of implementing new practices. As one worker describes This company … they just want you to push, push. … I'm going to do my job, and I'm going to do it to the best of my ability. But, they act like they're so ungrateful … our boss, he never has come out, "You did a good job," or nothing like that. They don't talk to the people, nothing like that, you know. … [W]ay back, we didn't have a problem with management stuff. They tried to work with you, they tried to be honest with you, and they didn't have favorite people and all that, you know.
The reference to "favorite people" refers to management picking key individuals on the shop floor to help implement change through. As managers I interviewed mentioned, they are often encouraged by consultants to focus on key leaders out on the floor to work through. Yet this may have the unintended result of making other workers perceive neglect. It also may contribute to limiting the breadth of empowerment. Here too, it seems that if there was substantive empowerment going on it still did not penetrate throughout the organization, even if there is greater opportunity for some substantive participation. Yet for some workers, at least, these opportunities do not alter their basic experience as workers in a capitalist factory; as one responded to my question about individuals working outside their job descriptions to make the transition work, in the end they must, otherwise "they would be all laid off. … [T]hey're the boss, they call the shots. We just follow their orders."
Second Tier Specialist: work organization
Second Tier Specialist, a union shop, is a low volume producer of industrial cylinders, selling mainly to fist tier mega suppliers such as Tower Automotive. They did value stream mapping on all of their products with the help of their parent company and reorganized the whole shop into three cells. The workforce of skilled machinists is slowly coming around to accept, and in some cases embrace a high performance work organization model (HPWO), from a much more adversarial stance. In one union leader's words They're coming around because we all believe in survival here. We want to make this thing, if this is the direction they want to go, we're going to work to get that direction. … [S]ome guys will run to the challenge, and some guys choose to run away from the challenge. Some guys want to stay locked in and do this … Some guys want to keep things as status quo as possible, and will learn new things as they're presented to them … We don't have many quitters around here. Guys want to move forward and want to make the best out of a situation.
While in practice the attempts at HPWO examined here emphasized many aspects of lean production, the organizing framework differs in that it is explicitly based on a extensive EI including broadly skilled and cross-trained workers (AFL-CIO 1994; Appelbaum et al. 2000; Cappelli et al. 1997; IAM 1999) . In a union shop a key obstacle is often getting rid of narrow job classifications. With the relatively short-tenured and lesser skilled workforce at Mini OE, management had little problem moving to a single job classification, in part due to the fact that they raise the wage rate for nearly all the workers. At Second Tier, they are struggling with the cross-training issue, working with a pretty restrictive contract with over 50 job descriptions and a traditional union culture with very long average tenure (22 years). Despite this rather serious stumbling block, they've had some help with people working outside classifications, otherwise moving to cells would have been "a real mess." Generally, they have made great strides from a splintered organizational structure and a high-waste, traditional manufacturing organization. They are very lean on the more technical aspects: a JIT system with continuous flow in the cells controlled by kanban containers. Lead time (purchase order to ship) has been reduced on two common cylinders from 18 days to 8 and 5, respectively, and they expect further dramatic improvements. On-time delivery has moved from 27% to the 80s in the two years.
Second Tier Specialist: employee involvement
Second tier has taken a layer out of management and is working toward developing selfdirected teams. However they have experienced a large amount of resistance from workers defending the arrangements they have developed substantial stakes in. As the union president notes, even though the union has formally signed on to a partnership, it is a struggle, even with some members of the shop committee.
I'm pushing it as hard as I can do. I'm receiving a lot of backlash. The backlash that I receive is intense … I've had a few clashes with the committee. … I see more people getting on the bandwagon. It isn't happening as quickly as I'd like to see it happen, but it is happening … the feeling that I get is most of the older employees who have been here a long time, I get the feeling that we're trying to tell them what they need to do in their job and that's a tough row to hoe. … They're tough to convince, they're tough to sway.
In this journey, sometimes rough, they have had significant help. The WRTP has facilitated a labor-management partnership. The parent of the local union, the International Associations of Machinists and Aerospace Workers (IAM) has a HPWO department that has also been instrumental in helping to bring the local workers onboard. As the plant manager stated:
Before me the process was dictated from above. Now I let them know what we need help in and we work together. So it's going over much better than the dictated approach which was going on before I got here, and that was very clumsy and met with a lot of resistance from the shop floor, which I fully understand. The company did a crappy job of implementing kaizen in the first place. First it was kamikaze kaizen . ...We're still in the process of educating people on the different lean tools and how to implement them. This is where the (IAM ) HPWO group can help us …. Also [a facilitator from the WMEP and WRTP] 6 , that's a big help. That's only going to help us more as people become more educated.
It is noteworthy that Second Tier has flown in a facilitator of the IAM HPWO department and allowed him to make a half-day presentation to the entire workforce. This is a signal of a serious commitment by management to substantive empowerment.
Second Tier has replaced foremen with cell leaders (management) which will become coaches and created an hourly cell lead person position for each cell. The cell lead, according to the plant manager, will do scheduling, freeing up the cell leader's time for organizing training, team building and kaizen. The plant manager notes "We really came from the old system with the foreman, which we don't have any more; we've taken a layer out of management." One of the new cell lead persons describes the problemsolving activities that he expects that team members will become more involved in as they develop A guy comes in and … he doesn't know what the supervisor, the expeditor, a person pushing that job is running up against. … But now I'm coming in, as the lead cell person, I'm getting an open order list and I'm looking at the components I need to put these products together and I'm saying, "For one reason or another we don't have tubes" … I worked for four years in production control at GE, so I know the ins and outs of working with customers, vendors, late product, partials and things of that nature. But the more people get involved out there, and the more information that they hear, I think the more involved they become.
A labor-management partnership has been instrumental in establishing a framework permissive of substantive empowerment. As a worker at Second Tier: "You get the three labor guys and the three management guys together -and we've been working together in the one format, now we're just moving a little closer, getting to know each other better. We already know the product, and here's where we can focus and get it to the customer a little bit better." Another worker at Second Tier described the labormanagement partnership and how management is giving up some authority: "The more input you've got as far as, they're giving up something in order to get something as well. I mean because they're, the right of management has always been there … they're giving up a little bit, and we're gaining some." Another worker agrees that management had given up authority: "And that's not easy for them to do." While these quotes are not very descriptive or elaborate, for workers in a union shop, especially one with history of rocky labor-management relations to acknowledge that management is attempting to share power is a non-trivial gesture.
It is important to properly understand the role of the labor-management partnership. A partnership based around a core labor-management committee helps to move labor-management relations beyond an adversarial model and to formalize a framework for collaboration. By providing a framework for formal power sharing and deliberation, such a framework may facilitate a more general substantive empowerment of the shopfloor workforce. In other advanced capitalist economies such as many in Western Europe, a works council model may provide a similar framework (Rogers and Streeck 1994) . However, while such a partnership may facilitate substantive empowerment under certain conditions -namely a collaborationist union leadership and a committed management -it is neither a necessary nor sufficient condition for substantive empowerment.
One worker indicates how at first he didn't feel like he was having sufficient say but then decided simply to be proactive and get involved. Another worker had just redesigned a work station which and the newly engaged worker "Didn't like the way it was structured … it wasn't to my liking …. Never was asked any input from the person doing it, or for the person that appointed him to do it. … So finally, I let it go, and I thought to myself, 'Alright, let's see what happens with the next area.' Well, it was happening again, and then I stepped in and I said, 'Hey, maybe I'll just take care of this one, okay? I don't like the way that person did the first one.' And they listened to me, and I put it the way I wanted and things worked out good that way."
As Appelbaum et al. (2000) note, there are a host of plant-level problems in implementing HPWO. In some cases a challenge comes from worker experience with management fads and other aborted attempts in the past, as a Second Tier worker explains: "We had some people come in here and said they were going to do wonderful things for us. ... And things didn't transpire the way they said they would. So there's that skepticism." In other cases the reasons for worker reticence has to do with the stakes they have developed in given arrangements. At Second Tier many of the workers had mastered one particular machine and had become accustomed to coming in every day and working only on this one machine. Most of the workers had a deep craft pride in their work, and expressed keen interest in the performance of the plant as a whole. Yet their understanding of their work was very much based in and around the routine they had developed by working on a single machine. They were not interested in cross training and job rotation; their work values were based in doing one thing and doing it well. Yet, as I have shown elsewhere (Vidal 2004) , even under this traditional Taylorist model, the "one thing" that these workers did actually consisted in a complex array of activities that involved careful attention and detailed, precise work that was considered challenging and rewarding. For these workers new routines and responsibilities required a substantial reorganization of work arrangements they had appropriated as their own and solidified in a union contract.
A(nother) paradox of empowerment: role stress and disabling kaizen Ultimately substantive empowerment takes dramatic and widespread organization change across many organizational systems, requiring vision and risk taking by management (Hackman and Oldham 1980; Brown and Reich 1989) . A common paradox is that workers often resist empowerment, as with Second Tier Specialist above and Custom Seats below. Another distinct paradox of empowerment is that that process of kaizen may be experienced as disabling, as broadened responsibilities and increased authority may lead to role stress.
The case of Industrial Pumps shows how attempted substantive empowerment in a nonunion environment is significantly harder and riskier to implement than nominal empowerment, as the elimination of hierarchy and specialization may generate ambiguity in goals and means leading to negative effects that counteract or overwhelm any enabling consequences of participatory standardization. The case of Custom Seats below shows how workers can experience kaizen as disabling due to role stress. Yet in the union shop nominal empowerment is not significantly easier or less risky as the union gives the workforce a collective (if still contested) voice and basis to defend certain arrangements or negotiate change.
Industrial Pumps: work organization Industrial Pumps, a nonunion shop, makes heavy-duty pumps that are sold primarily to the food and beverage industry. Before restructuring their system was extremely disconnected. Each operation was scheduled independently of the others; they worked from forecasts, making dozens of parts for each final assembly and there were pallets of parts everywhere. They had two full-time expeditors who would spend "all day, every day, walking three or four different parts through the plant to just get a couple orders off." They have moved away from forecasting and are now making only what they have orders for. Though orders are triggered from customer demand and there is much more communication between areas, each work station is still scheduled individually and parts are basically pushed through they system. However, they have implemented a number of lean practices and are dramatically more flexible. For example, on their CNC machining centers setup has gone from an hour and 15 minutes to 10 minutes or less.
Work is organized into three departments (polishing, machining and assembly) but there is cellular organization within them and they are just beginning VSM to further rationalize the product routings and better implement continuous flow. Five years ago they were quoting lead times at two weeks and typically shipping in about four weeks. Now they're quoting one to two weeks and shipping in about four days. On time delivery has gone from 30 to about 90%. Inventory turns have gone from below two to up around eight. They have seen profit growth every year since the recession while all of their competitors have either shut down or laid off workers. They attribute this success to their lean initiatives, specifically, their ability to respond quickly to customers, winning new business by being able to ship new orders out in a few days.
Industrial Pumps: Employee Involvement
In some senses the EI at Industrial Pumps is much deeper than in Tubefab or Integrated, with some elements of substantive empowerment, particularly with in terms of some real problem solving opportunities. Yet on the whole empowerment at Industrial was rather limited in breadth -for most workers their daily routines were largely the same and they were able to offer ideas but not participate in decision-making.
The main form of substantive participation was through various offline teams, including 5S (standardization), setup reduction, and VSM kaizen teams. The managers discussed how they the kaizen process was originally very top-down and met with much resistance: "the people that worked in the area, they just felt violated." Their espoused their new approach of trying to bring the workers around. Now they not only spent a lot of time on pre-training, but explaining what we expected to get out of it. And even if I knew what I would really like to see them try and do, I wouldn't say it, but I'd try to get them to say it … we spent a lot of time just having them discover … what a benefit of this could be. … We want it to be safe, we want it to be organized, we want it to be something that a lot of people can step up and do the same job at the same bench and get the same results.
They told a story of how their 5S standardization process resulted in them getting rid of seven Craftsman toolboxes from an assembly area that had three people, which made sense to the workers once they came up with the ideas on their own. In "each toolbox was 80 percent of the hand tools that Craftsman sells. … There was a complete set of metric wrenches and a complete set of English wrenches. And out of all of that, found out you don't even need a wrench to build the pumps they built."
Management discussed another example of workers being involved in real problem-solving activities
We were having issues with people pulling parts wrong. So we got the group together to brainstorm … what things are here that could possibly allow us to pull parts wrong… the old thought process was, if somebody pulled a part wrong they just must suck at pulling parts, they just don't know what they're doing, we need to train them better. And try to get them to start looking at it from the perspective of, maybe there's something about pulling the parts that's confusing or easy to mix up.
The team worked out a solution based on a color coding scheme that had less potential to be confused than the original numbering scheme.
Other kaizen events included VSM and 5S events where they would work on improving work organization. One worker noted how he really felt that the new system was making his routine better and giving him more power If we find that … something doesn't work in this area … I feel like I've got a better hands-on my job, I have a little bit more control. … I've seen that through the value stream … that you're finding out where the processes start out, you know, in doing the maps and finding out what is an outside vendor issue and what isn't. I've been able to approach … purchasing and again be able to ask them about when something's going to come in and not feel like, oh, I'm stepping out of my bounds. This is one of the two workers that management indicated has really enthusiastically taken to the EI and whom management has focused much of their training and cultivation efforts on, hoping he will be a leader to bring other workers around. But this worker also noted that others who aren't involved in the kaizen events do not really have any more control over their work situations. Other workers I spoke with said they had not experienced any increase in ability to give input and did not find the lean changes empowering. One worker described how his routine had changed as follows: "I guess as far as running the small batches … you might not get as bored as if you're running 10 or 20 of the same parts at … That's where the secondaries come in nice too … gives you something to do while your machine is running. So, all in all … it probably makes the day move a little faster I guess."
The offline teams did provide an opportunity for some workers to engage in substantive problem-solving. As one worker explained about the three VSM events they had in his area:
It was a group of engineering, assemblers, upper management was involved, our production coordinator was involved, and purchasing was involved, so they all knew what we were trying to accomplish. And then we would, we'd do the time studies, we'd write down everything that it took to do the process, and then we troubleshoot how we could eliminate certain things by rearranging an area, doing the 5S event. We found that, by changing suppliers and changing how we did different things, we could cut out costs.
But these offline opportunities happen only occasionally and are still initiated and organized by management. As one supervisor explained "management's open to any idea. … I mean it's more or less we're planning to move this and you have an idea, you don't tell us, I mean that's your loss." Some workers are not engaged at all in these opportunities while others experience them as less empowering, perhaps even as reducing their autonomy. In a 5S event workers are videotaped so they can see where to eliminate non-essential motions and one worker discussed how he was instructed that he didn't need to blow and wipe off a CNC machine: "They come in here and, 'Why are you doing this? Why are you doing that?' And it's like, you shouldn't have to do that twice, you know, even if it [only] took five seconds to take the rag and wipe that off after you had blown it off, because it's sticky coolant, you know, and the chips get gathered down there and if you don't wipe it, a lot of times they're still stuck there."
More generally, the EI process remained largely one of workers giving input -but not participating in decision-making -within a neo-Taylorist framework. Three of the workers I asked what their main ways to give input and participate were responded almost identically "just talking to a supervisor." Another responded more bluntly: "I'm not a decision maker. They don't leave it up to me to make the decision." This worker also quipped "They take our opinions. They weigh them. Sometimes they weigh against us." The effects of the standardization emphasis on employee participation were clearly evident to a machinist with 15 years tenure who said that now "it seems like there's a lot more channels to go through" when you give input because each change has to be approved by the engineers and plant manager.
Industrial has no online teams and no regular production meetings that involve front-line workers. However, unlike the other nonunion shops I visited self-directed teams were at least on their radar. They once tried to institute online teams but it "blew up in their face" because they implemented them "on paper" without any training or support. The teams were instituted early in the restructuring process, supervisors who were great at traditional responsibilities were not good at their new leadership role, and there was not enough cross training. New team leaders were confused and unsure about goals and means, having many new responsibilities for larger systems and employee development. Now they are focusing on leadership and manufacturing training for their first-line supervisors, and are hoping to work toward self-directed teams to replace a more traditional authority structure. For now they have backed off deep and wide substantive empowerment, working instead on lean continuous improvement within a framework of largely nominal empowerment, with some limited opportunities for substantive participation.
The question remains open whether Industrial will move in the future to a fuller substantive empowerment with self-directed teams. In the end, what they will need to overcome most may be worker reticence. As one manger stated about what he estimated were those 50% in the middle, neither enthusiastic nor antagonistic: "They're not going to come out and say, 'Can we tear my work area up and move stuff around because I think it would be better this way.' They'll just be like, 'When are they going to come fix my area?' And wait, and wait, and wait."
Custom Seats: work organization 7
Custom Seats, a union shop, makes seats for the recreational vehicle and lawn and garden industries. They have two "sides" of the plant, one with a "focused factory" (i.e., product focused cells) for a major customer along with a another non-cellularized production area for after-market parts for the same customer, and the other side with focused factories for all their other OEM customers. Custom Seats was right in the middle of a quite extensive restructuring process. They are still running orders based on forecasts but are hooked into their customers to ship based on a trigger system. Inventory has been reduced significantly and their inventory "turns," a common measure of how fast a company goes through its inventory (or, conversely, how long its inventory sits idle on the shelves) have been improving. On-time delivery in their oldest cell has gone from 92% at best before to a consistent near 100%.
Instead of collapsing job classifications "skill blocks" have been created with incentives so that a sewer will learn to upholster, and vice versa. The sewers are high skill positions, working with leather and vinyl with very tight seam allowances, which take minimum of twelve weeks to be fully trained. There was a lot of craft knowledge possessed only by the workers, and the production process was often completely dependent on individual experts. Mangers discussed in detail how the cells have been used as an opportunity to continuing to break down the tasks into smaller parts that can be standardized and the tacit knowledge more easily transferred. This was perhaps the clearest example of a neo-Taylorist model of work organization, as they broke down the core operation of seat-making, formerly done by one person, into four steps that would be done in cells by four workers. Workers were dissatisfied with this arrangement: "It's taking four people now to do what one used to do, and I don't know how this is beneficial, but that's what's happening"; and another worker similarly complains "I mean they've got four people over there doing what I used to do by myself … I just don't see how that's benefiting anybody or anything."
At the same time Custom had in many ways attempted to substantively empowerment their workforce, including broadened responsibilities with increased authority in other areas. Thus while deskilled in part through a standardization process workers were also reskilled through cross training and given substantially more authority and responsibility, which generated role conflict and stress, making some workers feel paralyzed. These problems were exacerbated by a transition from an individual piece rate system to a gainsharing system in which some workers lost between $5-10/, which generated serious antagonisms.
The new hourly wage with team incentives through gainsharing had somehow been negotiated without protections for the 29 workers it affected. In the eyes of some affected workers it was passed because they were only so few and the others simply voted on a contract to their own benefit. In any case, this was a significant problem for the functioning of the new system, as was the gainsharing program: "the gainsharing is so unreachable, it is so unreachable for so many reasons that [the workers have] learned that … if you slow down you can stay on overtime." Management came up with a formula for gainsharing based on the averages under the old system including those that were on incentive pay, and the teams apparently can't make the rate with the cells. This was in part because it's so high that people won't work that hard for so much less pay, and also in part, according to some workers, because the faster workers are only working at the speed of the slower workers.
Custom Seats: employee involvement Custom Seats has a kaizen program with extensive and enthusiastic participation from some front-line workers, though there are still times when workers in a particular group are not interested, so they'll have to get workers from outside the group, or do it without workers. They do extensive kaizening and reorganization -for example, they are on their fourth version of trying to work out the kinks in one of their high mix, low focused factories. The cells have a union lead position which makes decisions about what order to do the work in.
They still have traditional production supervisors and the would like to further decentralize scheduling and more indirect services into the cells but the union leadership is finding a lot resistance from the rank and file and is telling them not to go too fast. In this case, despite the serious efforts of management at decentralizing authority and problem-solving responsibilities, empowerment has largely been aborted or stalled due to resistance from the union rank-and-file; a paradox of empowerment, indeed. For three union elections in a row, over six years, the union leadership lost to a contingent running on an obstructionist platform -against the entire initiative including nominal empowerment. Each time the leadership "came around" to the partnership platform and only in the last election were they able to get reelected on the partnership platform. The President and VP of the union had just resigned, two days before my visit, because there was so much pressure from the floor. Yet, the management has been so dedicated to the HWPO process that they have been flying in a PACE (the local union)-friendly consultant who worked with Harley Davidson, a celebrity HPWO union-management partnership in Milwaukee, WI to the tune of $6000/day. This is a signal of a credible commitment on behalf of management to substantive empowerment.
Complaints with the new system ran the gamut, even for those not dramatically affected by the pay and incentive changes. One worker, one of the few in all my interviews, complained of work intensification, though he also notes management's intention: "they wanted the cells to be self-sufficient; I actually have more work than I ever had."
Another common complain, however, was that management's attempts at kaizen and extensive EI were experienced as disabling. One worker provides a typical summary, noting that in the kaizen events they have these brainstorms, where everything looks good on paper. And then they'll set it up that way and then they'll just leave. And then they'll expect the people that are in that cell to make it work, but it's like, you just give us half the stuff, you're not there to see it all the way through to the end. ... And it's like, you know, someone's got to be out there all the time to make sure that it works ... they just like get you going and then they'll stop and then they'll start another one ... you've got to see it through to the end, you know.
This was a common complaint at Custom, as workers were unable to resolve their role conflict, generated from not knowing how to balance and prioritize their new sets of responsibilities.
Others discussed similar situations, as one worker commented I think everything could work here if there was just better communication between management and the workers on the floor, you know. … We deal with this stuff every day. We know what the problems are. You know, it's just, there's too many little committees set up to fix a problem. … It seems like for a lot of companies nowadays, you know, I think that they worry about having meetings, they spend more time in meetings than they do doing anything else.
The point here is that the teams of workers are supposed to actively take the responsibility to solve the problems on their own. It appears that there has been too much decentralization of authority and responsibility, and in any case some workers felt disabled or paralyzed when given the opportunity to engage in decision-making and problem-solving. It's possible that some of this has to do with lack of resources for workers, but my reading of the case is that management did spend significant resourcesthey have both an active kaizen program coordinator and separate training coordinatorincluding extensive work with a "trainer training" program. These workers were supposed to take the initiative to engage in problem-solving and independently initiating lateral communication with other workers and engineers, figuring out on their own how to "see it through to the end." The attempts at substantive empowerment here were not only dysfunctional but also limited and partial. Many of the problems discussed here were from workers in lower volume, higher variety cells that were harder to work the kinds out of. Another worker who worked in a high volume dedicated cell told a much different story: "We just follow the schedule they set up and just do along the line, down the line. … We don't talk about it, we don't decide nothing. Come in the morning, we just look at the board, what the lead, the line leader set up, just look at it, we go to it and start doing it."
Conclusion
All of the firms I visited implemented a package of lean practices including various mechanisms to increase worker input. At different levels, all had undergone significant restructuring and had achieved significant performance improvements including reduced inventory and lead times and increased quality and on-time delivery. Furthermore, each had some form of continuous improvement. Though in each case there was some increase in responsibilities and/or the opportunity to share ideas, I have argued that in most cases such "empowerment" is nominal, by which I mean it involves a real, though slight difference from the traditional Taylorist model but is trivial in terms of any increase in workers' power or control over the labor process. Workers may be actively encouraged to give their ideas, may be involved in the occasional kaizen event, and may even be given brief training in lean tools such as 5S, TQM and root cause analysis. But without some real devolution of decision-making responsibilities in which front-line workers have the effective capacity to exercise some authority, such empowerment is not substantive.
Under a regime of nominal empowerment, ideas mainly flow "up" from front-line workers to decision makers who deliberate, plan and resolve without substantial participation from what remain subordinates. Thus, workers were often frustrated not because they failed to convince others of their suggestions in a deliberative process, but because higher-up decision makers failed to implement their ideas as such.
I have argued that lean production within nominal empowerment can achieve significant performance improvements through continuous improvement to reduce waste and lead times, increase flexibility and product quality, improve work flow and tighten process control. Given these outcomes managers, who operate with a limited, approximate definition of the situation, may continually tinker with smaller technical improvements in production but shy away from the larger and more risky systemic transformations necessary to substantively empower the workforce. They may be satisfied with outcomes achieved and unwilling to take the risk of substantive decentralization of responsibilities and devolution of authority to push beyond nominal empowerment for an uncertain payoff. Depending on the calculus of managers, substantive empowerment may also bring negative consequences, not only in terms of loss of control over key management prerogatives but also wage demands. With a disorganized workforce a given management may decide not to risk these negative consequences, thus preferring a nominal empowerment regime, especially if real performance effects are achieved. However, in a union shop these negative consequences may already be present, and the nominal empowerment of the workforce may be much harder given the institutionalized power of the union. Given these conditions and the fact that there is already some degree of power-sharing in the plant, substantive empowerment may be interpreted as less hard and risky. This may alter the incentive structure and definition of the situation to make substantive empowerment a more viable alternative.
The technical issues involved in modern manufacturing are extremely complex, and from a technical standpoint lean methods are interesting and effective. Learning how to do value stream mapping, setup reduction, and how to use other lean tools are can be a challenging and effective process that yields real improvements. Moreover, my observations do not suggest that managers and engineers are concerned with controlling or dominating labor, as many Marxists have suggested and Edwards (1979) has forcefully argued about technical and bureaucratic aspects of the Fordist labor process. My observations suggest that Adler (1995) is partially correct that the focus has switched from coercing labor effort through standardization from a presumably recalcitrant workforce to utilizing the adaptability and ideas of labor to generate better methods. But my data suggest more of an advanced form of bureaucratic control able to solicit workers ideas -lean production under a regime of neo-Taylorism with nominal empowermentthan a bureaucracy enabling substantively empowered workers. For Marxist theory an important aspect of future research should thus be more precisely specify the historical and geographical conditions that have made a consent-based form of neo-Taylorist control possible.
